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Abstract
This paper presents a study of the Internet infrastructure in India from the point
of view of censorship.
First, we show that the current state of affairs – where each ISP implements
its own content filters (nominally as per a governmental blacklist) – results in
dramatic differences in the censorship experienced by customers. In practice, a
well-informed Indian citizen can escape censorship through a judicious choice of
service provider.
We then consider the question of whether India might potentially follow the
Chinese model and institute a single, government-controlled filter. This would
not be difficult, as the Indian Internet is quite centralized already. A few “key”
ASes (≈ 1% of Indian ASes) collectively intercept ≈ 95% of paths to the censored
sites we sample in our study, and also to all publicly-visible DNS servers. 5, 000
routers spanning these key ASes would suffice to carry out IP or DNS filtering
for the entire country; ≈ 70% of these routers belong to only two private
ISPs. If the government is willing to employ more powerful measures, such as
an IP Prefix Hijacking attack, any one of several key ASes can censor traffic for
nearly all Indian users.
Finally, we demonstrate that such federated censorship by India would cause
substantial collateral damage to non-Indian ASes whose traffic passes through
Indian cyberspace (which do not legally come under Indian jurisdiction at all).
Keywords: India, Network Monitoring, Anti-Censorship
1 Introduction
The current study of Internet censorship is mostly focused on openly censori-
ous countries – China [37,52,43], Iran [34], Pakistan [55], etc. Even world-wide
studies of censorship [32] essentially focus on countries well known for their cen-
sorship. However, in practice, many other countries still implement some form of
censorship, which may even be more insidious because citizens are barely aware
of it (for example, Sweden [6] and France [4]). In this paper, we consider the
case of India, a major emerging power with over 450 million Internet users [19]
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(up from 180 million in 2013, and on track to overtake Europe, which has 520
million users in all). India has been ambivalent about its censorship policy for
years [13] (for example, in August 2015, the government ordered 857 target
sites blocked, then backtracked in the face of public outcry [24]), but in context
of the fact that legally 3 the executive branch in India holds unqualified power
to block information, it is natural to be concerned about free speech in India.
We begin by asking what policy, and what mechanism the Indian government
currently employs; how this might change in future; and what unintended effects
such censorship might have on foreign traffic transiting Indian ASes.
Our first step was to formally approach the authorities, by filing a Right to
Information [25] request (RTI), inquiring about the policies and mechanism the
government uses to block content. While the policy itself was confidential, the
government was willing to share that the responsibility for filtering lies with
individual ISPs, and that they could implement any mechanism they choose4,
as long as they uniformly comply with the given censorship policy.
In practice, an ad hoc approach to filtering generally leads to inconsistencies
and errors [54], especially during updates [48]. Our initial experiments suggest
that this is indeed the case; filtering policies are highly inconsistent across ISPs
(see table 1), contrary to the government’s expectations as stated in the official
response. The current “feudal” approach to policing the Internet in India, viz.
allowing ISPs to implement their own censorship mechanisms (which, as we
show, do not “strictly adhere” to government diktats), results in inconsistent
censorship policy enforcement: for e.g., our findings show that users may be able
to evade censorship more easily when accessing pornographic sites via Airtel, a
large private ISP that screens fewer sites, compared to others such as MTNL.
We next consider the question of how, in future, the government might en-
force a unified censorship policy for the whole country. The usual mechanism to
enforce a single policy, is to redirect all Internet traffic through a single point of
control, where all the traffic can be monitored(this approach has been employed
by Iran [34], Venezuela [7], and Saudi Arabia [60]). Even in the case of China,
a whole layer of state-controlled ASes must be used to act as a filtering layer
that provides Internet connectivity to other ASes [60]. Nearly all the filtering is
carried out by two Autonomous Systems - AS 4134 and AS 4812 [62].
Can the government, in future, force all networks to re-route their traffic
via a chosen ISP so as to monitor the network ? We note that India’s Internet
infrastructure was grown through a laissez-faire approach (closely correlated
with the cellular networking boom), and now consists of ≈ 900 ASes (over 170
of which are ISPs) [28]; it would require a massive effort to redirect all traffic
through this new provider. Quite likely, the amount of disruption caused by such
a redirection would make it difficult for a democratic nation to implement by
fiat.
3 Information Technology Act of India 2008 (Section 69A)
4 IP and URL blacklists [38] are common, but ISPs may choose to employ more inva-
sive techniques, such as DNS Injection Attacks [47] or even IP Prefix Hijacking [35,46]
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Might the government implement filtering with the existing infrastructure,
without necessarily enforcing traffic redirection? For the existing network, is it
possible to find a small set of “heavy-hitter” ASes (and network elements in
these ASes) that can potentially monitor or censor traffic without too much
collateral damage? More formally:
– Is it feasible to filter/monitor India’s Internet traffic? If so, how, and where?
Given that India has over 900 ASes,
1. Are there a small number of key ASes and routers where the government
can intercept most Indian traffic to censored sites?
2. How does the number of censorious ASes required, vary with the censor-
ship technique – e.g. IP blacklisting, DNS Injection, IP Prefix Hijacking?
– How much collateral damage will traffic filtering cause? Internet censorship
by an “upstream” AS can lead to inadvertent traffic filtering for its cus-
tomers. How much impact can Indian censorship have on traffic that simply
transits Indian cyberspace?
To answer the above questions, in this paper, we map the AS-level paths from
each Indian AS to the potentially censored websites (our test corpus includes not
only the sites publicly announced as being blocked, but also others from public
resources such as Herdict [12]). We then construct router-level maps within these
ASes, using Rocketfuel [58]. Finally, we identify the “key” ASes and routers,
i.e. those which appear in an overwhelming majority of paths (and which are,
therefore, the logical locations for network filtering).
Our experimental findings reveal that ten ASes cumulatively intercept over
95% of the paths connecting Indian ASes to the sites in our study (i.e. potentially
censored sites). Eight of these key ASes, acting together, can poison ≈ 99% of
the network paths leading to DNS resolvers in India (as well as other publicly
available services such as GoogleDNS and OpenDNS), thus censoring URL re-
quests. Even more alarming, when we consider another mechanism of censorship
- IP Prefix Hijacking - we find five ASes, each of which can individually poi-
son the BGP routes for almost all ASes in the country. Even though the actual
number of routers needed for such efforts varies dramatically (from 7 in some
ASes, to as high as 1782), overall, a total of less than 5000 routers across all the
eight ASes are required for IP or DNS filtering – about 70% of which routers
belong to two large private ISPs and any one of five key ASes is enough, if the
government resorts to more aggressive measures like IP Prefix Hijack.
Finally, we note that paths that transit Indian ASes but originate outside
India form a substantial fraction of the Internet: if India were in fact to adopt a
comprehensive censorship scheme in its key ASes, she would censor about 1.15%
of all Internet paths to the censored sites, worldwide.
Thus, the above findings would indicate that, in fact, ordinary Indian citizens
should be concerned about censorship, and perhaps start to equip themselves
with anti-censorship tools [39].
We begin by discussing the background and related work, in the next section.
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2 Background and Related Work
The interaction of the Internet with government policy (especially censorship
and privacy issues) is a controversial subject [15,30,14]. Our case study in this
paper, India, is a democratic nation, but there is sufficient evidence of Indian cen-
sorship [8,21] that anti-censorship research organizations declare India “partly-
free” [20]. For example, the Indian government officially demands that organi-
zations (e.g. Google Inc., Microsoft etc.) censor pages deemed objectionable [9].
At present, the government delegates the censorship of traffic to ISPs, as per
ambiguous blacklists5. This loose approach to censoring traffic leads to inconsis-
tent filtering across ISPs – some users may be able to evade censorship by virtue
of their provider ISP.
The question arises whether the Indian government can impose a centralized
filter (as seen in e.g. Iran). Creating a new AS and redirecting through it would
have high costs in network disruption, latency, service quality, and so on. But
such a process will not be necessary if the current structure of Indian Internet
is already well suited for monitoring and censorship.
To determine the set of ASes and routers where adversary may install in-
frastructure for censoring large fraction of network paths, as they exist today,
we generated AS and router-level maps of India. We used such maps to identify
such key ASes and routers, and the impact they have.
2.1 Background
Our paper relies heavily on mapping the structure of the Internet, an area of
research called network cartography [44]. The Internet consists of routers and
hosts, but also has some further structure: the routers and hosts belong to Au-
tonomous Systems, which are independent networks (independent in the sense,
they themselves choose who to exchange traffic with). Consequently, Internet
mapping proceeds at two levels:
1. AS-level mapping. For our research, we required Internet maps representing
paths connecting IP address of censored site to various ASes. We thus chose
Gao et al.’s [56] AS path mapping approach. Their technique uses publicly-
available BGP routes (obtained from various Internet Exchange Points across
the globe [31])) and the relationships between the ASes [41], and outputs a
directed graph of the Internet connecting IP prefixes to all ASes of the world.
Other AS-level mapping approaches, such as the CAIDA Ark Project [3] and
iPlane [53], involve traceroute probes from various vantage points to IPs
in different ASes. Such approaches rely on traceroute and are generally
limited by the network locations and availability of the volunteered probing
nodes; they may not provide the AS-level path between any two randomly
chosen ASes.
2. Router-level mapping. An AS is not a black box, but contains hosts and
routers. Mahajan et al. [58] show how the internal structure of an AS can be
5 Several authors have mentioned how these blacklists vary over time [11,1]
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mapped, by a combination of traceroute probes, IP alias resolution6, and
reverse DNS lookups.
Powers of the Adversary: Our adversary is a censorious government. The adver-
sary aims to filter Internet traffic, and for this purpose may perform IP filtering,
DNS injection/URL Filtering, and IP prefix hijacking attacks. We note that
even a government has limitations; for example, it would prefer to implement
filtering at a small number of locations, rather than at every ISP network in the
nation, because of both various political and technical factors (e.g. if changing
the blacklist implies wide scale router level re-configuration, there will almost
certainly be inconsistencies and failures in enforcement).
2.2 Related Research
Much of the study of modern Internet censorship was developed in the context
of China [63,49,62,61], particularly the different censorship techniques employed
and the network destinations filtered. For e.g., Winter et al. [61] examine how
the Chinese authorities use DPI-capable routers to detect Tor Bridges. Others,
such as [33], explored the mechanics of DNS filtering and how China is con-
tributing to collateral damage. A major step forward was made by Verkamp et
al. [32], who deployed clients in 11 countries (including India) to identify their
network censorship activities – IP and URL filtering, keyword filtering and DNS
censorship etc. Later authors – Nabi et al. [55] in Pakistan, and Halderman et
al. [34] in Iran – demonstrate different methods of censorship employed by their
respective regimes, as well as different forms of content blocked. Such studies
of censorship in repressive regimes are often limiting, as they require Internet
access from almost all network locations inside the country (Nabi et al. were
able to get access from only five locations, and Halderman from only one).
We take a different direction with this paper. While we begin by examining
instances of network censorship in our target country (India), our main aim is to
determine the potential for censorship, in case the regime decides to become more
censorious. Specifically, how bottlenecked is the Indian Internet? Is it possible
for the adversary to place censors in a relatively small set of ASes and routers,
and still filter a large fraction of network paths (and thus potentially users)? -
if so, this presents a much lower barrier to entry than monitoring in every AS.
The most relevant related work we are aware of, is Singh et al.’s study of how
Internet censorship correlates to network cartography [59]. The authors show a
strong correspondence between the Freedom House Index [5] of a nation and
its Internet topology, and indeed, claim that a nation’s network topology is the
best indicator of a countrys level of freedom. Our work makes use of network
topology as well: we use it to determine the “key” network locations (ASes and
routers) where the adversary (censorious government) would rationally deploy
censorship infrastructure, if its aim was to censor all or almost all Internet traffic
in the country, and the impact of such measures on network paths originating
both within and outside the nation (but transiting Indian ASes). We perform
this study for various traffic filtering techniques in the following section.
6 Different interfaces of the same router, with different IPs, are called IP aliases
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3 Motivation, Problem Description and Methodology
3.1 Preliminary Findings and Motivation
Well-studied censorious countries, such as China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, tend
to have a very clear censorship policy. In contrast, India has a rather ad hoc
approach: the government expects all ISPs to (independently) enforce its policies.
We find that in practice, traffic filtering is highly inconsistent across popular
Indian ISPs – the set of blacklisted sites varies by orders of magnitude.
ISP Website Categories
Escort Music Porn Torrents Social Political Tools Misc.
(150) (100) (50) (30) (20) (20) (20) (150)
Airtel 50, 80, 20 82, 6, 12 1, 49, 0 13, 16, 1 8, 10, 2 2, 15, 3 1, 14, 5 80, 41, 29
Vodafone 24, 87, 39 95, 1, 4 2, 45, 3 16, 11, 3 8, 8, 4 0, 13, 7 4, 11, 5 70, 35, 45
Sify 12, 98, 40 1, 75, 24 1, 48, 1 6, 22, 2 0, 16, 4 0, 15, 5 1, 16, 3 11, 75, 64
NKN 11, 105, 34 57, 33, 10 1, 48, 1 10, 16, 4 4, 12, 4 2, 14, 4 1, 14, 5 65, 56, 29
BSNL 41, 69, 40 68, 12, 20 0, 45, 5 12, 14, 4 7, 10, 3 4, 12, 4 3, 14, 3 88, 27, 35
MTNL 27, 98, 25 81, 2, 17 45, 3, 2 15, 12, 3 9, 8, 3 14, 1, 5 2, 12, 6 73, 23, 54
Siti 23, 99, 28 28, 56, 16 44, 4, 2 14, 13, 3 9, 8, 3 1, 14, 5 1, 12, 7 86, 29, 35
Reliance Jio 0, 123, 27 0, 77, 23 0, 38, 12 2, 26, 2 0, 18, 2 0, 16, 4 0, 15, 5 0, 78, 72
Table 1. Censorship trends in India: Some initial results.
To study such inconsistencies, we selected a list of 540 potentially censored
websites, divided into 8 different categories (ranging from escort services, to anti-
censorship tools like Tor [40]). We then systematically observed the censorship
policy in different ISPs, by trying to access our potentially-censored websites
through them.
Table 1 summarizes our findings. The rows represent the ISPs, columns cor-
respond to the category of site which being filtered, and each entry is a 3-tuple
(cn, on, xn) representing the number of each type of response – censored, open,
and inaccessible. 7 For example, we probed 150 escort websites through the Airtel
network, and observed 50 to be censored, 80 open, and 20 inaccessible.
7 We explain these terms below.
– Censored: the ISP intercepted the requests, and responded with an HTML iframe
displaying a filtering message (indicating that requested URL had been blocked as
per the directions from the Department of Telecommunication).
– Open: Websites were accessible without filtering.
– Inaccessible: Websites were “down”. There was not enough information to deter-
mine if the sites were inaccessible due to network or system outages, or requests
were deliberately filtered or throttled by the ISP.
6
We note that the variation of censorship by ISP is quite dramatic: Airtel
blocks only 1 out of the 50 pornographic sites probed, whereas MTNL blocks
45.
It is clearly difficult to get hundreds of independent ISPs to correctly comply
with censorship orders. The question arises whether, if the government decides
to enforce a single policy, it is able to do so. So the question arises, are there a
few key bottlenecks in the existing network, where filtering may be carried out?
3.2 Problem Description
In our research we are particularly interested in finding a small set of key loca-
tions (ASes and routers) that intercept a large fraction of network paths. More
specifically, our questions are as follows.
– Is it possible for the government to monitor/censor a large fraction of In-
ternet traffic by controlling only a small number of network locations (viz.
ASes and routers)?
– What fraction of traffic could be filtered, and who would be most affected?
– Would such censorship affect users outside the country as well?
3.3 Evaluation Methodology
Identifying Potential Network locations for IP filtering: In order to estimate the
locations for installing IP filtering infrastructure, we built an AS-level map using
paths in the Internet, then focused on Indian ASes and their connections. Our
map was built using Gao’s algorithm [?], which finds AS-level paths to the home
AS of chosen IP prefixes (in our case, censored sites) from every other AS in the
Internet. The algorithm uses links from known AS paths in BGP routing tables;
we obtained tables from a number of vantage points [31].
Unlike other nations, which have an unambiguous list of blocked sites [55],
India has no clear censorship policy. We created a corpus of sites blacklisted by
various government decrees (as reported by popular media), and also added the
sites reported as blocked in India by the crowd-sourced censorship-reporting sites
like Herdict [12]. These included social media sites, political sites, sites related
to unfriendly nations, and p2p file-sharing sites. Finally, we added to the list the
adult sites popular in India (as per Alexa [2]).
We randomly sampled about 100 sites from this corpus. We then computed
the paths between all Indian ASes and these prefixes. The ASes appearing in
these paths were sorted by frequency of occurrence; we thus selected the few
most frequent ones.
Do these ASes appear in paths to other potentially blocked sites as well? To
answer such questions, we re-estimated our paths with another set of about 220
sites, chosen from the corpus. The heavy-hitter ASes for this new set of paths
were the same as the ones found before.
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Intra-AS topology generation: In the second round of experiments, we employed
the Rocketfuel algorithm [58] to compute the router-level paths through 10
heavy-hitter ASes (i.e. major Indian ISPs), then identified the routers which
occur in a large fraction of paths (i.e. the heavy-hitter routers in heavy-hitter
ASes), as follows.
1. Using planetlab nodes, we ran traceroute probes to three representative
IPs in each prefix advertised by the ASes and by their immediate (1-hop)
customer ASes.
Traceroute returned router level paths leading to and out of the said ASes.
2. From the traceroute trace, we chose the sub-paths consisting of router IPs
advertized by the AS under study (i.e. router within the ASes, identified
from [16]).
3. We resolved the aliases (corresponding to the discovered router IPs) with
Midar [18] alias resolution tool.
4. Finally, from the discovered traceroute paths we selected the minimum
number of routers which cumulatively intercept a large fraction of the paths.
To do this we chose the following heuristic:
– If total number of edge routers are less than total number of edge and
core routers that intercept a large fraction of the paths (over 90%), then
we selected the edge routers alone (as the set of edge routers cover 100%
of paths through the AS).
– Else, we selected the “heavy-hitter” (core plus edge routers), appearing
in a very large fraction of the paths (over 90%); not all edge routers
may appear as often as others (edge and core routers appearing in the
discovered paths).
Identifying Potential Sites for DNS based filtering: Another common approach
to censorship is to prevent the DNS service from resolving requests. The cen-
sor either instructs DNS servers (within its jurisdiction) to filter requests for
blacklisted URLs, or installs infrastructure to intercept DNS queries on routers
(en-route to DNS servers) and respond with bogus IPs or NXDOMAIN responses
– also referred to as DNS Injection attack.
Filtering DNS requests, either by simply dropping them, or by responding
with bogus responses, could be carried out at the DNS server. However, in a
country like India, hosting more than 55000 DNS servers, distributed across
different networks, reconfiguring all such servers to filter DNS queries for black-
listed sites would not be easy (besides simple disobedience, there would also be
misconfiguration bugs, delays, and network downtime). It would be much more
practical to identify a few ASes (and routers therein), that intercept all or almost
all the network paths connecting DNS servers to all ASes in the country.
To identify key ASes for DNS injection, we began by identifying the DNS
resolvers across all Indian prefixes. We probed IP prefixes of every Indian AS for
available DNS servers (UDP port 53) using nmap [51], and noted whether the re-
sponse was open, filtered, or closed. (Closed corresponds to ICMP ’destination
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port unreachable’ message responses from the destination. Open means the
client received a meaningful response. Filtered indicates that the client received
no response 8.)
Each IP, for which we obtained a filtered or open response, was sent a
request to resolve the IP address of some popular WWW destinations (e.g.
https://www.google.com). Addresses that allowed resolution were added to
our list of publicly available DNS resolvers.
Finally, using Gao’s algorithm, we constructed a graph of prefix-to-AS paths
connecting the IP prefixes corresponding to DNS resolvers, and all the Indian
ASes. To find the ASes which would be most effective at DNS injection, we
identified ASes at the intersection of a large number of these paths.
Impact of IP Prefix Hijack Based Censorship: In an IP Prefix Hijacking attack,
malicious BGP routers advertise fake AS-level paths9 in an attempt to poison
routes to an IP prefix (see Figure 1), thus attracting a large volume of traffic
[35,42,45,57,36].
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F1 
Att advertises fake path 
<Att--F1--Pr> to B 
Victim AS containing 
prefix Pr 
Fig. 1. IP Prefix Hijacking: Valid path: A − B − C − D − E − Pr. A is the origin
AS and Pr the AS with the destination prefix. Attacker Att advertises a shorter path
Att−F1−Pr, to AS B. If B chooses this path and directs its traffic to Att, the attacker
can censor the traffic.
Prefix hijacking is an extremely aggressive attack, and unlikely to be used in
practice; but it has been used in the wild (e.g. blocking of YouTube by Pakistani
ISPs [23], and also those involving ConEd (US), TTNet (Turkey), Link Telekom
(Russia) among others [46]) and remains viable as an orthogonal way of cen-
soring traffic. So for completeness, we have also considered prefix hijacking as a
potential tool for censoring the Internet in India.
In general, for a successful prefix hijack attack, the malicious AS either broad-
casts a shorter path to the prefix, or claims to own it outright. The attacking
AS advertises fake routes for the targeted prefix to all its neighbors. Ballani
et al. [35] report that receiving ASes accept these advertisements based on the
following heuristics:
8 This may be due to unavailability or filtering by firewall(s)
9 Alternatively, router misconfiguration can also lead to similar situations [54]
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1. If there exists a customer path towards the target IP and iff the advertise-
ment presents a shorter customer path, then choose it, else reject it.
2. If there exist a provider path towards the target IP and iff the advertisement
presents a shorter provider path, then accept it. For all other cases, the paths
are accepted without considering the length.
3. If there exist a peer path towards the target IP and iff the advertisement
bears a shorter peer path, accept it. Customer paths are accepted without
length considerations while provider paths are ignored.
Estimating the Impact of Prefix Hijack Attack: To study the potential
impact IP prefix hijacking, we used the previously constructed AS-level topol-
ogy and chose an attacker AS with a high node degree(i.e. the number of ASes
adjacent to the said AS). Inspecting the prefix-to-AS paths, we identified ASes
with which the attacker AS had a business relationship, and applied Ballani’s
heuristics to determine the number of ASes potentially affected by fake adver-
tisements.
Collateral Damage Due to Traffic Censorship: Several non-Indian ASes rely
on Indian ASes for Internet connectivity. Censorship activities in Indian ASes
may potentially filter the traffic of these non-Indian customers as well [33]. For
example, such unintended filtering was reported by Omantel, that peers with the
Indian ISP Bharti Airtel [17]. As one of our research objectives, we try to identify
ASes outside India that may be affected by Indian censorship. We identify paths
which do not originate in India, but pass through or terminate in India. The
non-Indian customers on such paths may face unwanted access restrictions.
4 Experimental Results
Continuing from the description of our experiment in the previous section, in
this section we present our results. First, we consider router-level filtering, and
how many ASes and routers must be selected for effective censorship (in terms
of coverage of paths to filtered destinations). Along similar lines, we identify the
locations where the adversary could launch a DNS injection attack. We go on to
present the results of simulating IP prefix hijack attacks on Indian ASes. Finally,
we report the collateral damage to foreign ASes due to IP filtering in India.
4.1 Network Locations for IP (Router-Level) Filtering
As mentioned earlier, we first obtained paths connecting Indian ASes to about
100 potential target sites (chosen from our corpus). Figure 3 represents the
number of paths an individual AS intercepts; the horizontal axis of the graph
indicates the ASes, ranked according to the number of paths each one intercepts.
A small number of Indian ASes appear in the overwhelming majority of these
paths; these ASNs and their owner organizations are presented in the table 4.1.
The question remains whether the ASes we observe are simply an artifact
of the 100 target sites we chose. To check whether this is so, we repeated the
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Rank ASN Owner
1 9498 Bharti Airtel
2 4755 Tata Comm.
3 55410 Vodafone
4 9583 Sify Ltd.
5 9730 Bharti Telesonic
6 9885 NKN Internet
7 55824 NKN Core
8 45820 Tata Teleservices
9 18101 Reliance Comm.
10 10201 Dishnet Wireless
Table 2. AS Ranks, their ASNs and their owners.
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Fig. 2. CDF of Indian paths intercepted by ASes.
experiment with another (non-overlapping) sample of 220 target sites from our
corpus. The same 10 ASes covered the vast majority of paths to both sets of tar-
get sites, indicating that they are very likely major Indian providers of Internet
infrastructure, and cover a majority of paths to any target sites.
The cumulative results of paths intercepted vs total number of ASes, corre-
sponding to both experiments, is presented in figure 2. As evident, we only need
4 ASes to censor over 90% of the paths to the censored destinations, and 10
ASes for 95% of the paths. Figure 3 represents the number of paths intercepted
by each of these ASes individually.
Intra-AS Topology: We now consider the question of which routers (in our key
ASes) are responsible for carrying the vast majority of Indian Internet traffic.
Following Mahajan et al.’s approach [58] (as described previously in Subsec-
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Fig. 3. Paths intercepted by individual ASes vs AS rank (by path freq.) Total 186679
paths from Indian ASes to 211 prefixes (hosting 320 potentially filtered sites).
tion 3.3), we create router-level maps of the key ASes, and identify routers that
appear on a large fraction of the paths.
Figure 4 shows the fraction of paths these routers cumulatively intercept. (For
privacy concerns, we refrain from revealing the IP addresses of these routers.)
ASN # of # of # of # of
Edge Core Heavy DR’s
Routers Routers Hitter Required
(E) (C) Routers min(E, H)
(H)
9498 1782 5321 5192 1782
4755 1779 6229 6434 1779
55410 133 594 634 133
9583 484 4458 4275 484
9730 7 63 62 7
55824 66 325 254 66
45820 193 1147 1132 193
18101 462 2724 2677 462
10201 90 1396 1315 90
Table 3. The total number of edge and core routers in 9 ASes that appear in
over 90% of the discovered paths. For eg.,. AS4755 has a total of 8404 routers
(1779 edge + 6229 core). However, the total number of edge routers (1779) is
less than the number of heavy hitters (6434).
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Fig. 4. CDF of traceroute paths intercepted by individual routers, sorted by increas-
ing number of paths through each router (for 8 important ASes.)
Table 3 represents the number of edge and core routers that cumulatively
appear in over 90% of the traceroute paths. The adversary could choose to
place filters either at these points - heavy hitter routers of the heavy hitter ASes
- or at the edge routers of the ASes, which together see all the traffic that passes
through the AS. We find that the total number of edge routers is less than the
number of “heavy-hitting” edge and core routers, and conclude that the lowest-
cost solution for the adversary is to install censorship infrastructure on the (total
of 4996) edge routers.
We note that, at present, the number of key routers varies significantly across
ASes, from 7 to 1782. In case of the larger ASes, the AS network administrator
could likely improve on our figures, by combining our findings with better in-
formation about the router-level topology and setting routing policy to pass all
traffic through a smaller number of routers. Hence our count of 4996 routers is
essentially an upper bound, limited by the policies of the present day.
Collateral Damage: Our graph of paths from censored prefixes to ASes has
186, 679 paths of Indian origin (1.76% of paths). A comparable number - 121, 931
paths of foreign origin (1.15% of paths) - transit through or terminate in an In-
dian AS. Censorship by Indian ASes may inadvertently impact a very large num-
ber of unintended customers, across Finland, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia,
the US, and so on.
4.2 Censorship Through DNS Filtering
Using our approach for identifying open DNS resolvers, we identified a total of
55, 234 publicly accessible DNS servers from probing all 12.10 million Indian IPs.
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Fig. 5. CDF of DNS paths intercepted by top 10 Ases.
After identifying the prefixes corresponding to these each resolver IP, we se-
lected one corresponding to each AS10 In all, we selected 355 prefixes, representa-
tive of 355 unique Indian ASes. Finally, using Gao’s algorithm, we estimated the
paths from each Indian AS to the (prefixes corresponding to) DNS resolvers in
India. Cumulatively, 8 ASes (according to path frequency) can intercept 99.14%
of these paths, and potentially launch DNS based filtering or Injection attacks
(see figure 5).
We note that these 8 ASes also appear among the 10 top ASes we identified
for IP filtering and IP prefix hijacking. Hence, the same key routers for each
of these ASes (as per Table 3) may be selected for installing infrastructure to
launch DNS injection (or other DNS level filtering schemes). In all, 4906 routers
across the 8 ASes can cumulatively filter DNS traffic for all Indian ASes 11.
4.3 Censorship Through IP Prefix Hijacking
For IP prefix hijacking, we chose to simulate attacks from the ASes with high
node degree. Based on our censored-prefix-to-AS topology graph, we identified
the top 10 ASes by node degree, and determined the number of ASes potentially
vulnerable to attacks from each of these ASes. The results of these simulations
are presented in table 4.
The table shows that a small number of ASes in India can potentially affect
traffic from all Indian ASes, as well as a considerable number of foreign ones. For
example, fake advertisements by AS4755 can impact a total of 955 ASes (896
Indian and 41 others). To effectively launch an IP prefix hijacking attack, the
government needs control over the BGP speakers (which form a small fraction
of all the routers of an AS); for ASes such as AS9730, with 7 edge and 63 core
routers, this number is probably very small.
10 For multiple prefixes belonging to same AS, we selected one with most resolvers.
11 As mentioned in the previous sub-section, this number may be further reduced by
routing optimization on the part of the AS network administrator.
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Number of Affected AS’es
Owner Name Attacking ASN Indian Non-Indian
Bharti Airtel Ltd. 9498 896 59
Tata Comm. 4755 896 41
Reliance Comm. Ltd. 18101 896 41
Vodafone Spacetel 
Ltd.
55410 896 42
Sify Ltd. 9583 896 58
Bharti Telesonic Ltd. 9730 749 23
Tata Teleservices 45820 560 1
Host Palace 13329 896 45
Dishnet Wireless Ltd. 10201 896 24
Idea Cellular Ltd. 55644 896 37
Table 4. IP prefix hijack: A single AS (e.g. AS9498), is well capable of censoring
the traffic of all 896 Indian ASes and few (59) non-Indian ASes through prefix hijack
attack.
4.4 Analysis of Results
We observe that a very small number of ASes (less than 10) intercept a large
fraction of AS-level paths connecting Indian ASes to our list of potentially cen-
sored sites (obtained from public announcements of censored sites in India), and
that this affects a substantial number of foreign users as well. While this result
is interesting, there remains the question of whether it applies to censored sites
in general, or only the ones in our sample.
Our request to the Indian government, under its own Right to Information
Act [25], for the complete list of censored sites 12, was refused by the Indian
Government Department of Telecommunications and IT, citing confidentiality
concerns. Therefore, to cross-validate our results we randomly sampled two sets
of target sites from our corpus, and ran our algorithm on each in isolation. The
same set of key ASes appeared in both sets. 13
We believe that DNS filtering is a viable threat. Should the aforementioned
ASes filter DNS requests, they would also impact over 99% of the AS-level paths
connecting Indian ASes to DNS resolvers both within and outside India (par-
ticularly services such as GoogleDNS and OpenDNS). We note in passing that
DNS filtering is more powerful than simple IP filtering: even if a censored site
were hosted in a Content Distribution Network (CDN), a user would be unable
to reach its content on the CDN, as the request would still have the URL of the
origin site, and would thus be filtered.
Finally, while IP prefix hijacking is rarely used (owing to its potential to
cause major network outages - e.g., the Pakistan Government’s blocking of
Youtube [23]), there exist five Indian ASes, each of which could censor traffic for
all (or nearly all) Indian users by launching an IP prefix hijack attack. Moreover,
12 RTI number: DOTEL/R/2017/50126
13 We also note that these ASes are, in fact, partners to foreign network providers,
and provide connectivity for almost every smaller AS in the country. This is perhaps
unsurprising, given the hierarchical nature of the Internet as a whole [41].
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only a handful of routers in each of these ASes – viz. the BGP speaking routers
may be sufficient for such attacks.
5 Limitations and Future Work
5.1 Limitations
Our approach in this paper is to generate AS and router-level maps of India,
and identify the key ASes and routers that intercept a large fraction of network
paths. This approach is clearly limited to a snapshot of routing at a moment
in time, and in fact we intend to see how our results vary over several years in
future work. In addition, our AS-level and router-level mapping algorithms have
the following limitations.
AS path estimation (Gao’s algorithm): Our path estimation strategy is
limited by the quality of publicly-available BGP routes.
– Route-collector bias: It has been argued by Gregori et al. that the existing
route collectors (like routeviews [27], BGPmon [29], RIPE [26], PCH [22]
etc.) miss many of the peering relationships between smaller ASes; our map,
as it uses Routeviews data, inherits this weakness.
– Incorrect route advertisements: In general, BGP routes are known contain
artifacts of misconfiguration and bogus advertisements [50,23]. Our esti-
mated paths may also be contaminated with such artifacts.
Router level topology estimation: The discovered topology may not reveal
the actual router-level paths for packets traveling between the IPs of the probed
AS and the censored websites.
– Router-level path variability: Router-level maps of an AS are far more vari-
able than AS-level maps: the latter rely on AS peering information (which
is based on business relationships, that do not change frequently), while the
former change with network conditions. Routing tables themselves are prone
to inconsistencies and bogus routes [48,54].
– Imperfect coverage by Traceroute: We used a large number of planetlab
nodes to launch traceroute probes 14, but there remains a chance that
some routes are simply not covered; further increasing the number of van-
tage points, i.e. probing hosts, may improve our topology estimation by
discovering new paths.
– Routers filtering traceroute probes: In many cases, routers are configured
to not reply to traceroute probes with the usual ICMP TTL Expired mes-
sages, and remain anonymous, thereby reducing the accuracy of our esti-
mated router-level topology.
14 The looking-glass servers used by the original authors [58] were unavailable at the
time of our experiments.
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5.2 Future Work
Our study of Internet censorship in India can be directly extended to other
nations; while our case study was done with Indian data, we make use of no
features peculiar to India. We are currently extending our analysis to other
countries, and developing metrics for how “centralized” a country is (i.e. how
many key ASes it takes to censor traffic in a country), as well as how “central”
it is in the global Internet (measured by the extent of collateral damage it can
cause). There are several other directions to extend this research, which we will
explore next.
First - objectionable content is frequently hosted on social media sites, or
other sites with apparently benign URLs. Might the government target search
engines and social networking sites as well(as seen in China)? Would this be a
full blacklist, or partial? 15 And if so, would our key ASes be different for these
target websites?
There is also the question of whether popular anti-censorship and anonymity
preserving tools like Tor may be attacked by controlling a few network points.
Finally, we also intend to consider the question of policing the cellular data
network16, in our future work.
6 Concluding Remarks.
Though the Indian state declares that it has a unified Internet censorship policy,
the current state of censorship (where the responsibility of network filtering is left
to individual ASes) is highly inconsistent. However, our results also show that
if the Indian government wishes to impose a single policy, the structure of the
Indian Internet shows that it would only need to control a small set of locations.
(Furthermore, a significant fraction of network paths from foreign customers,
which transit India, will be collateral damage for Indian censorship.)
1. Though India has ≈ 900 ASes, 10 ASes cover ≈ 95% of AS-level paths;
a nationwide censor using IP-filtering functionality would need to control
≈ 5000 routers – a challenging, but tractable, number. In particular, two
private ISP networks control over 70% of those routers (and may optimize
the router selection further).
2. DNS based filtering requires only eight of these ASes and impacts > 99% of
the AS-level paths connecting Indian ASes to the DNS resolvers both within
and outside India (for services like GoogleDNS and OpenDNS).
3. Any one of five ASes is capable of disrupting network connectivity for all
Indian ASes, through IP prefix hijacking attacks.
India, unlike China, is still ambivalent w.r.t. censorship, but the findings in this
paper indicate that ordinary citizens should indeed be concerned (and possibly
start to equip themselves with censorship circumvention techniques), as large
scale censorship would not be very difficult for the government to implement.
15 Semantics-based filtering is very hard; e.g. attempts to block jihadi mouthpiece sites
also block sites that monitor jihad as a threat, such as jihadwatch.org.
16 As per reports published in recent years, India has 860 million cellular users [10]
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